The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1991/91_1523/91_1523.zo

Text File | 1993-11-09 | 13.5 KB | 270 lines

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 91-1523
--------
FLORENCE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT FOUR,
et al., PETITIONERS v. SHANNON CARTER,
a minor by and through her father, and
next friend, EMORY D. CARTER
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the fourth circuit
[November 9, 1993]

  Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. 1400 et
seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), requires States to provide
disabled children with a -free appropriate public educa-
tion,- 1401(a)(18).  This case presents the question
whether a court may order reimbursement for parents
who unilaterally withdraw their child from a public
school that provides an inappropriate education under
IDEA and put the child in a private school that provides
an education that is otherwise proper under IDEA, but
does not meet all the requirements of 1401(a)(18).  We
hold that the court may order such reimbursement, and
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

                            I
  Respondent Shannon Carter was classified as learning
disabled in 1985, while a ninth grade student in a
school operated by petitioner Florence County School
District Four.  School officials met with Shannon's
parents to formulate an individualized education pro-
gram (IEP) for Shannon, as required under IDEA.  20
U. S. C.  1401(a)(18) and (20), 1414(a)(5) (1988 ed.
and Supp. IV).  The IEP provided that Shannon would
stay in regular classes except for three periods of
individualized instruction per week, and established
specific goals in reading and mathematics of four
months' progress for the entire school year.  Shannon's
parents were dissatisfied, and requested a hearing to
challenge the appropriateness of the IEP.  See
1415(b)(2).  Both the local educational officer and the
state educational agency hearing officer rejected
Shannon's parents' claim and concluded that the IEP
was adequate.  In the meantime, Shannon's parents had
placed her in Trident Academy, a private school special-
izing in educating children with disabilities.  Shannon
began at Trident in September 1985 and graduated in
the spring of 1988.
  Shannon's parents filed this suit in July 1986, claim-
ing that the school district had breached its duty under
IDEA to provide Shannon with a -free appropriate public
education,- 1401(a)(18), and seeking reimbursement for
tuition and other costs incurred at Trident.  After a
bench trial, the District Court ruled in the parents'
favor.  The court held that the school district's proposed
educational program and the achievement goals of the
IEP -were wholly inadequate- and failed to satisfy the
requirements of the Act.  App. to Pet. for Cert 27a.  The
court further held that -[a]lthough [Trident Academy]
did not comply with all of the procedures outlined in
[IDEA],- the school -provided Shannon an excellent
education in substantial compliance with all the substan-
tive requirements- of the statute.  Id., at 37a.  The
court found that Trident -evaluated Shannon quarterly,
not yearly as mandated in [IDEA], it provided Shannon
with low teacher-student ratios, and it developed a plan
which allowed Shannon to receive passing marks and
progress from grade to grade.-  Ibid.  The court also
credited the findings of its own expert, who determined
that Shannon had made -significant progress- at Trident
and that her reading comprehension had risen three
grade levels in her three years at the school.  Id., at
29a.  The District Court concluded that Shannon's
education was -appropriate- under IDEA, and that
Shannon's parents were entitled to reimbursement of
tuition and other costs.  Id., at 37a.
  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
950 F. 2d 156 (1991).  The court agreed that the IEP
proposed by the school district was inappropriate under
IDEA.  It also rejected the school district's argument
that reimbursement is never proper when the parents
choose a private school that is not approved by the State
or that does not comply with all the terms of IDEA.
According to the Court of Appeals, neither the text of
the Act nor its legislative history imposes a -require-
ment that the private school be approved by the state in
parent-placement reimbursement cases.-  Id., at 162.  To
the contrary, the Court of Appeals concluded, IDEA's
state-approval requirement applies only when a child is
placed in a private school by public school officials.
Accordingly, -when a public school system has defaulted
on its obligations under the Act, a private school
placement is `proper under the Act' if the education
provided by the private school is `reasonably calculated
to enable the child to receive educational benefits.'- Id.,
at 163, quoting Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson
Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 207
(1982).
  The court below recognized that its holding conflicted
with Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free School Dist., 873
F. 2d 563, 568 (1989), in which the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that parental placement in a
private school cannot be proper under the Act unless the
private school in question meets the standards of the
state education agency.  We granted certiorari, 507 U. S.
___ (1993), to resolve this conflict among the Courts of
Appeals.

                           II
  In School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed.
of Mass., 471 U. S. 359, 369 (1985), we held that IDEA's
grant of equitable authority empowers a court -to order
school authorities to reimburse parents for their expendi-
tures on private special education for a child if the court
ultimately determines that such placement, rather than
a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.-  Congress
intended that IDEA's promise of a -free appropriate
public education- for disabled children would normally
be met by an IEP's provision for education in the
regular public schools or in private schools chosen jointly
by school officials and parents.  In cases where coopera-
tion fails, however, -parents who disagree with the
proposed IEP are faced with a choice: go along with the
IEP to the detriment of their child if it turns out to be
inappropriate or pay for what they consider to be the
appropriate placement.-  Id., at 370.  For parents willing
and able to make the latter choice, -it would be an
empty victory to have a court tell them several years
later that they were right but that these expenditures
could not in a proper case be reimbursed by the school
officials.-  Ibid.  Because such a result would be con-
trary to IDEA's guarantee of a -free appropriate public
education,- we held that -Congress meant to include
retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available
remedy in a proper case.-  Ibid.
  As this case comes to us, two issues are settled: 1) the
school district's proposed IEP was inappropriate under
IDEA, and 2) although Trident did not meet the
1401(a)(18) requirements, it provided an education
otherwise proper under IDEA.  This case presents the
narrow question whether Shannon's parents are barred
from reimbursement because the private school in which
Shannon enrolled did not meet the 1401(a)(18) defini-
tion of a -free appropriate public education.-  We hold
that they are not, because 1401(a)(18)'s requirements
cannot be read as applying to parental placements.
  Section 1401(a)(18)(A) requires that the education be
-provided at public expense, under public supervision
and direction.-  Similarly, 1401(a)(18)(D) requires
schools to provide an IEP, which must be designed by -a
representative of the local educational agency,- 20
U. S. C. 1401(a)(20) (1988 ed., Supp. IV), and must be
-establish[ed],- -revise[d],- and -review[ed]- by the
agency, 1414(a)(5).  These requirements do not make
sense in the context of a parental placement.  In this
case, as in all Burlington reimbursement cases, the
parents' rejection of the school district's proposed IEP is
the very reason for the parents' decision to put their
child in a private school.  In such cases, where the
private placement has necessarily been made over the
school district's objection, the private school education
will not be under -public supervision and direction.-
Accordingly, to read the 1401(a)(18) requirements as
applying to parental placements would effectively
eliminate the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized
in Burlington.  Moreover, IDEA was intended to ensure
that children with disabilities receive an education that
is both appropriate and free.  Burlington, supra, at 373.
To read the provisions of 1401(a)(18) to bar reimburse-
ment in the circumstances of this case would defeat this
statutory purpose.
  Nor do we believe that reimbursement is necessarily
barred by a private school's failure to meet state
education standards.  Trident's deficiencies, according to
the school district, were that it employed at least two
faculty members who were not state-certified and that
it did not develop IEPs.  As we have noted, however,
the 1401(a)(18) requirements-including the require-
ment that the school meet the standards of the state
educational agency, 1401(a)(18)(B)-do not apply to
private parental placements.  Indeed, the school
district's emphasis on state standards is somewhat
ironic.  As the Court of Appeals noted, -it hardly seems
consistent with the Act's goals to forbid parents from
educating their child at a school that provides an appro-
priate education simply because that school lacks the
stamp of approval of the same public school system that
failed to meet the child's needs in the first place.-  950
F. 2d, at 164.  Accordingly, we disagree with the Second
Circuit's theory that -a parent may not obtain reim-
bursement for a unilateral placement if that placement
was in a school that was not on [the State's] approved
list of private- schools.  Tucker, 873 F. 2d, at 568 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  Parents' failure to select
a program known to be approved by the State in favor
of an unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimburse-
ment.
  Furthermore, although the absence of an approved list
of private schools is not essential to our holding, we
note that parents in the position of Shannon's have no
way of knowing at the time they select a private school
whether the school meets state standards.  South Caro-
lina keeps no publicly available list of approved private
schools, but instead approves private school placements
on a case-by-case basis.  In fact, although public school
officials had previously placed three children with dis-
abilities at Trident, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a, Tri-
dent had not received blanket approval from the State.
South Carolina's case-by-case approval system meant
that Shannon's parents needed the cooperation of state
officials before they could know whether Trident was
state-approved.  As we recognized in Burlington, such
cooperation is unlikely in cases where the school offi-
cials disagree with the need for the private placement.
471 U. S., at 372.

                           III
  The school district also claims that allowing reim-
bursement for parents such as Shannon's puts an unrea-
sonable burden on financially strapped local educational
authorities.  The school district argues that requiring
parents to choose a state-approved private school if they
want reimbursement is the only meaningful way to
allow States to control costs; otherwise States will have
to reimburse dissatisfied parents for any private school
that provides an education that is proper under the Act,
no matter how expensive it may be.
  There is no doubt that Congress has imposed a signifi-
cant financial burden on States and school districts that
participate in IDEA.  Yet public educational authorities
who want to avoid reimbursing parents for the private
education of a disabled child can do one of two things:
give the child a free appropriate public education in a
public setting, or place the child in an appropriate
private setting of the State's choice.  This is IDEA's
mandate, and school officials who conform to it need not
worry about reimbursement claims.
  Moreover, parents who, like Shannon's, -unilaterally
change their child's placement during the pendency of
review proceedings, without the consent of the state or
local school officials, do so at their own financial risk.-
Burlington, supra, at 373-374.  They are entitled to
reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both
that the public placement violated IDEA, and that the
private school placement was proper under the Act.
  Finally, we note that once a court holds that the
public placement violated IDEA, it is authorized to
-grant such relief as the court determines is appropri-
ate.-  20 U. S. C. 1415(e)(2).  Under this provision,
-equitable considerations are relevant in fashioning
relief,- Burlington, 471 U. S., at 374, and the court
enjoys -broad discretion- in so doing, id., at 369.
Courts fashioning discretionary equitable relief under
IDEA must consider all relevant factors, including the
appropriate and reasonable level of reimbursement that
should be required.  Total reimbursement will not be
appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the
private education was unreasonable.
  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
                                            So ordered.